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Abstract 
The role and importance of a company’s CEO has become an increasingly important topic of 
research.  The executive leadership has an important role to play in defining the strategy of the firm 
and its ability to compete. The value relevance of the CEO of a company and thus any changes 
pertaining thereto is understood to be due to developments in information technology and reporting 
requirements. This characterizes an information environment whereby investors are better equipped at 
making more informed investment decisions. The current business has become increasingly more 
competitive and volatile. In response to this, market participants place greater value on the importance 
of the CEO of the company. The CEO of a company may possess the ability to lever the company 
above its competitors through the development and implementation of company strategy. 
This research report assesses how market participants react in response to CEO appointment 
announcements using a sample of 105 announcements using an event study methodology. The value 
relevance pertaining hereto can be ascertained by observing the abnormal returns of the company’s 
share price on the date of the announcement. In furtherance of this assessment, the sample is 
disaggregated in accordance to event specific, firm-specific and non-event specific factors. Prior 
research suggests that this analysis facilitates more robust inferences to be made on how market 
participants react to CEO appointment announcements. In both Africa and South Africa, a strong 
body of literature is yet to be established on this effect. 
In general, findings display significant market reactions in response to the CEO change, thus 
suggesting that market participants perceive the CEO change as a significant event in the life of the 
firm. On the day of the event strong positive abnormal returns were generating thereby indicating that 
investors react positively to the appointment of a new CEO. However, the negative cumulative 
abnormal returns displayed in the periods before and after the event can be interpreted as the contrary. 
In addressing these conflicting views, the analysis of share performance in relation to firm-specific, 
event-specific and non-event related factors proves useful. The findings in this part of the section 
explain that negative returns are due to increased uncertainty over the future of the company, the 
positive returns on announcement date are found to be strongly associated with the type of successor 
appointed. These findings further reveal market participants react significantly strongly to a CEO 
change as seen by high negative cumulative abnormal returns.  These findings contextualize how the 
value attached to CEOs by market participants vary in relation to different conditions. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 1.1 Purpose and context 
In terms of agency theory, the agency, in general terms consists of the relationship between 
the principal and the agent. This relationship occurs when the principal hires the agent to 
perform a service on behalf of the principal and in doing so they would commonly delegate 
decision-making authority to the agent. Several studies have indicated that the dominant 
normative mandate for directors is the maximization of shareholder wealth. The creation of 
shareholder wealth is inferred mostly from increases in share prices, dividends and equity 
issued. Managing a company with the focus of creating value is argued to begin with strategy 
and end with financial results and it is the responsibility of the executive leadership of an 
organization to plan and implement a strategy that creates shareholder wealth (Knight 1998). 
It seems that the creation of shareholder value is to a large degree influenced by the 
performance of executive leadership.  
 1.1.1 The importance of a Chief Executive Officer 
The way in which the market interprets the future performance of the company is said to be 
one of the key factors that determine the respective company’s share price (Meckel 2007). 
(Clayton 2003) lends support to this view, as he argues that changes in executive leadership 
are significant events in the life of a firm. This can be characterized by the capacity of the 
leadership of a firm to choose projects, set the financial policy of the firm and establish a 
corporate culture. Across the globe, stock markets react to various corporate announcements. 
Given the importance of Chief Executive Officers (CEO), any changes hereto is argued to be 
one of the significant announcements that markets react to (Nthoesane 2014). Previous 
studies approach understanding this effect by analysing how the share prices react in response 
to the CEO appointment announcement.  
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 1.1.2 The Investor perspective 
It is important to recognise that the market reaction in response to a CEO appointment 
announcement may be influenced by factors specific to the company or CEO appointment 
announcement. This understanding is corroborated by prior research which evidence that 
factors such as the origin of the successor, reason for the change, firm size, and whether or 
not the company is in financial distress influence share price performance in response to the 
CEO appointment announcement (Bonnier 1989). 
 1.2 Statement of the problem 
The objective of this study is to develop an understanding on how a change in the CEO of a 
company will affect its share performance for JSE listed companies. Existing literature is 
argued to provide inconclusive results on this subject matter (Nthoesane 2014). These studies 
have produced findings which indicate that the markets across the globe react either 
negatively, positively or insignificantly to a change in CEO. Furthermore, several studies 
reveal that factors such as: origin of successor (internal or external), the reason for CEO 
change (voluntary or involuntary), firm size, and whether not the company is in financial 
distress or not influence the markets’ reaction to CEO appointment announcements. This 
research report assesses the effect CEO appointment announcements on share prices of JSE 
listed companies.   
1.3 Purpose of the study  
The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect CEO appointment announcements have 
on share price performance of JSE listed companies, and thereby determine the extent to 
which investors value the role of a CEO in relation to the future of the company. 
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 1.4 Significance of study  
Research on this topic is well documented across the globe. The findings of (Nthoesane 
2014) which indicate that investors generally react negatively in response to announcements 
over changes in CEOs. These findings were consistent with (Lassoued 2013) in Tunisia, 
(Kang 2009) in Asia, (Charitou 2010 ), (Van Doom 2011 ), (Vafeas 2009 ) in Europe and 
(Lubatkin 1989) in America. There is however, limited research in this area in Africa to 
ascertain whether there is any emerging trend on how investors react to announcements of 
CEOs (Nthoesane 2014). Given that earlier views provided by researchers such as (Warner 
1988) who found a significant association between poor stock performance and the frequency 
of management turnover. There appears to be a strong ground to argue that changes in CEOs 
could result in changes in share price performance of JSE listed companies. This research 
report fills the gap in the current body of knowledge in South Africa and Africa by 
investigating the share price performance in response to a CEO appointment announcement. 
 1.5 Definition of Terms  
  Event Study Methodology: an empirical study performed on a security that has 
experienced a significant catalyst occurrence, and has subsequently changed 
dramatically in value as a result of that catalyst. The event can either have a 
positive or negative effect on the value of the security. 
  Abnormal Returns: returns generated by a given security over a period of time that 
is different from the expected rate of return.  
  Change in CEO: it is brought about as a result of the death, resignation, hiring or 
removal of the CEO.  
 Value relevance can be described as the ability of information disclosed about a 
company to reflect in the firm value of that company (Kargin, 2013).  
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1.6   Research Question 
The research questions addressed in this report are as follows: 
Research question 1: To what extent do changes in CEO result in changes in the share price 
of companies listed in the JSE? 
Research question 2: To what extent does the reason for CEO change (voluntary or 
involuntary), nature of CEO successor (internal or external), firm size and health of the 
company undergoing a CEO change influence share price performance in response to CEO 
appointment announcements?  
1.7 Assumptions 
Event study methodology assumes that capital markets reflect the economic implications that 
the analysed event has for the firm in question. In other words, event studies, using the 
market model are underpinned by the presumption that the market is efficient. The 
applicability of this event study methodology is thus dependent on whether or not the share 
price of the firm promptly responds to new information released to the capital market 
(Warner 1980). For the purposes of this study, new information would constitute the CEO 
change announcement.  
In assessing the market’s reaction to changes in CEOs, it has been assumed that the dominant 
normative mandate for managers is the maximization of wealth for shareholders, primarily 
through the maximization of profit. The market model has been used to calculate the normal 
returns of the individual security. Although the market model is the most commonly used 
method of estimating normal returns, it is subject to a number of assumptions. The market 
model assumes that the market is efficient, this means that share prices at all times reflect all 
available information (Durlauf 2007). From (Fama 1970), the strong form of the Efficient 
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Market Hypothesis (EMH) states that an equity market efficiently converts all information 
into accurate security prices. The semi-strong form of the hypothesis states that equity 
markets will be able to process all publically available information. The market model used 
in event studies are to a large degree influenced by the assumptions underpinning the capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM), these include: the market is perfectly competitive, there are 
many small investors and they are price takers, there are no taxes or transaction costs, all 
investors analyse information in the same way and all investors have access to the same 
information. 
The following assumptions are considered relevant in addition to the above mentioned, these 
include: management decisions are made with the intention of creating shareholder wealth 
(Cao 2006), (Cao 2010), (Zhao 2011), (Hagel III 2000), (Bowman 1993). The JSE’s Stock 
Exchange News Service (SENS) announcements are complete in terms of announcements 
pertaining to CEO changes. Share price volatility is an appropriate measure to assess the 
market response to CEO turnover announcements (Fama 1969), (McWilliams 1997). The 
market processes information in an unbiased and efficient manner (Fisher 2011). The CEO 
turnover announcement is unanticipated, and the abnormal returns are a result of reaction to 
CEO turnover announcements. The data collected from the JSE is accurate and complete.  
1.8 Scope Limitations  
This research report analyses how share prices of JSE listed companies react in response a 
change in CEO. A change in CEO is a significant event in the life of a firm. A CEO’s 
knowledge, ability and decisions will affect the performance of the corporation. To the extent 
that these characteristics and resulting decisions differ across individuals, changes in 
management can alter the course of the firm and its performance (Clayton 2003). This report 
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does not analyse the impact of the individual characteristics of the CEO’s on the share prices 
of listed companies. The focus is rather on the effect of the announcement.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The literature review has been divided into three sections. The first will shed light on the role 
executive leadership in a company and how the knowledge possessed by the CEO assists in 
creating shareholder value. The second section will discuss the reasoning why share price 
volatility can be expected in companies undergoing a CEO change. In this section, the value 
relevance of CEO appointment announcements will be discussed and empirical evidence will 
be used to substantiate these notions. The third section will discuss the effect of CEO changes 
on share price performance in relation to its constituents, that being the information effect of 
the announcement and the real effect of the CEO change. This effect is further explained in 
relation to non-event specific factors, and these factors may influence market reaction in 
response to a CEO change. The final section will discuss the information efficiency of the 
JSE, as the efficiency of the market contextualizes share price returns in response to the CEO 
appointment announcement when considering how new information is reflected in share 
prices.  
 
2.1 Executive leadership of an organization  
The executive leadership of an organization in modern economics is becoming an 
increasingly important topic of research. The executive leadership has an important role to 
play in defining the strategy of the firm and its ability to compete. If the executive leadership 
of the organization changes this may lead to changes in the firms’ strategy. Moreover, the 
person who replaces the departing executive also has the capacity to change firm structures 
(Agrawal 2000), fix previous unprofitable investment decisions (Weisbach 1995) and 
increase internal controls (Denis 1995). The findings from these studies argue that changing a 
CEO may result in a change in firm value.    
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2.1.1 Knowledge Assets and Knowledge Management 
In today’s economy the value of companies is increasingly dependent on intangible assets. 
Results obtained from traditional factors such as labour, land and capital are becoming more 
dependent on effective usage of knowledge and therefore knowledge management (Volkov 
2007). The current business environment is characterised by fast, volatile and extreme 
competition. Therefore in order for an organization to survive it must be agile, responsive and 
flexible. Further, the new economy is argued to be characterized by a shift to knowledge as 
the main determinant of economic growth and success (Hamel 1994). The shift to knowledge 
as the primary source of value lends support to the importance of developing and managing 
intellectual capital of organizations to create distinctive and sustainable value (Kaplan 2001).  
 
From an organizational standpoint, knowledge is available from sources both internal and 
external to the entity. Therefore, in order to capture and effectively utilize such knowledge 
there appears to be a requirement for knowledge management initiatives, for quality 
improvement, innovation, efficiency and for improved decision making. (Davenport 2000) 
argues that the only source of competitive advantage which can be leveraged is the ability to 
create, find and combine knowledge into new products and services faster than competitors.  
From a market perspective, knowledge has started to be viewed as an asset in its own right 
and not only as an enhancement of other kinds of assets (Constantinos 2003) and can take the 
form of “anything without physical substance embedded in people, derived from process, 
firm culture, brands, patents, etc.” (Bukowitz 1999). It is clear that the knowledge of a CEO 
can result in improved decision making in discharging their duties. However, the value-
relevance of the CEO knowledge is viewed in relation to how this knowledge results in 
improved decision making on the part of the rest of the company, (Crawford 2011) argues 
that the CEO of the company plays a key role in shaping and expanding knowledge systems.  
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It is clear from the above that the knowledge of the CEO has bearings on CEO decision 
making and their duties in developing and implementing company strategy. This corroborates 
the understanding that changing the CEO of a company could impact the organizations’ 
perceived future prospects and thus its share price performance.  
 
2.2 Value- relevance of CEO appointment announcements 
The value-relevance of CEO appointment announcements examines how CEO changes may 
result in a change to the share price performance of the company undergoing a CEO change. 
In addition, this section, empirical evidence of prior studies investigating this relationship is 
presented.  
2.2.1 Value- relevance to market participants 
The first step in analysing the effect a change in a company CEO has on share price 
performance requires an understanding on how market expectations change in response to 
new information. This is explained by (Clayton 2003), who states that equity volatility is 
largely associated with new information being incorporated into prices, given market 
efficiency. A company’s share price reflects the value capital market participants attach to 
that company. It is the market participants’ perceptions, opinions, recommendations and 
decisions that determine a company’s share price (Meckel 2007 A change to the CEO of a ). 
company, may be interpreted as a signal to the market that the company is either in need of or 
has undertaken measures to improve firm performance (Setiawan 2008). 
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2.2.2 Empirical Evidence 
Several studies have been undertaken in assessing market reactions to changes to the 
company CEO; these findings however, are mixed. In the US, (Weisbach 1995), (Denis 
1995) and (Huson 2003) found positive reactions to announcements regarding changes in the 
CEO. Research about market reaction to CEO turnover in Asia, i.e. in Japan conducted by 
Kang and Shivdasani (1996) shows positive abnormal returns. Dahyaa and McConnel (2003) 
show that there is evidence that market react favourable to CEO turnover announcement and 
find positive abnormal returns around CEO turnover announcements. This indicates that 
market perceives CEO succession as an improvement of a firm’s performance, or good news, 
and therefore investors were observed to react positively.  
Conversely, (Reinganum 1985) did not find any market reactions in the US. In the UK, there 
have been similar cases of mixed reactions to changes in CEOs. However, Dedmen and Lin 
(2002) found negative abnormal returns around CEO turnovers and claim that markets react 
negatively to CEO turnover announcements. Richard, Sing and Barr (2001) support these 
findings using Australian data, as investors in Australia reacted negatively to CEO change 
announcements.  
In summary, there appears to be a strong body of knowledge supporting the view that a 
change in CEO of an organization may result in a change in the value market participants 
attach to the company. 
2.3 The effect of CEO changes on share price returns 
Several studies have revealed that changes of CEO can have a significant impact on 
shareholder wealth and on firms operations (Denis 1995). The effect on a company’s share 
price as in response to a change in company’s CEO can be decomposed into an information 
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effect (e.g. change is a signal that the firms’ prospects are worse than previously believed) 
and a real effect (the successor is expected to improve performance). (Furtado 1990) found 
that the abnormal returns of the company share performance was typically around 25-50 basis 
points, (Bonnier 1989), found a stronger positive return of 2.5% by isolating the real effect by 
focusing on the share price performance of financial distressed firms listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange (where an announcement is unlikely to signal significant information about 
the state of the firm).  
The above explains that the share price reaction in response to CEO changes can be attributed 
to an information effect and real effect. The information effect is how market participants 
react to the CEO change announcement in relation to the how the announcement makes a 
signal pertaining to the health of the company. The real effect resulting from the CEO change 
is how market participants perceive the value of the company in relation to the replacement 
CEOs ability to create shareholder value in the future.  
2.3.1 Information effect 
The first point in understanding the effect a CEO change has on share price returns of a 
company requires decomposition of the effect into the information effect of the 
announcement and the real effect. The information effect can be interpreted to be the signal 
effect the announcement has on the health of the company. This is often observed through the 
reason for the CEO change. As such, a forced turnover typically follows a period of poor 
performance (Clayton 2003). Therefore, when a CEO change is not at the discretion of the 
departing CEO, this is often due to the CEO not meeting certain performance requirements 
thereby signalling to the market that the company has not achieved its targets.  
Since a firm that experiences a forced turnover is likely to be smaller and more levered than 
its peers, it is also more likely to be more volatile (Clayton 2003). This is consistent with the 
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findings of Roll (1988) who observes that a significant portion of stock return variation is not 
attributable to general market and industry movements and suggests that these residual 
movements represent the impounding of firm-specific information into prices. This 
corroborates prior research on event returns on different management positions as explained 
by (Warner 1980), (Beatty 1987), (Coughlan 1985) and (Weisbach 1995).  
Ciccone (2006) develops three hypotheses about how changes in CEO might affect share 
price volatility. He tests these hypotheses using a sample of 872 CEO turnovers over the 
1979-95 periods. He found that volatility increases following a CEO turnover, even when the 
CEO leaves voluntarily and is replaced by someone from inside the firm. Forced turnovers 
increase volatility more than voluntary turnovers; a finding consistent with the view that 
forced departures implies a higher probability of large strategy change. For voluntary 
departures, outside successions increase volatility more than inside successions. This 
volatility change can be attributed to increased uncertainty over the successor CEO's skill in 
managing the firm's operations (Clayton 2003).  
Forced turnovers can be defined as turnover that results from reasons other than customary 
retirement (Weisbach 1995). Generally forced turnovers can be divided into two types, that 
being board initiated turnovers and CEO initiated turnovers. Research focusing on this area 
suggests that markets react differently to board initiated and CEO initiated turnovers (Furtado 
1990 . Friedman and Singh (1989) predict that CEO initiated turnovers will lead to a positive )
market reaction, but at a lower level than that of board initiated turnovers. The origin of the 
CEO i.e. internal or external to the firm will typically depict whether there is a CEO 
succession programme in place. When this is the case, CEO initiated turnovers will either 
signal that the CEO wishes to change his organizational affiliation or position and market 
himself to external parties. Here, a negative market reaction is expected due to unwelcomed 
change and disruptions in external relations. 
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It is important to recognize that the CEO appointed is not the sole reason for any changes to 
investor expectations. The information effect of the CEO appointment announcement 
indicates that the reason behind the change of the CEO can be interpreted as a signal to the 
 market on the state of company affairs.
2.3.2 Real effect 
The real effect of the CEO change on share price returns is evidenced from the change in 
value that market participants place on the company in relation to its future prospects. The 
likelihood of future success, ability to meet forecasts and implement strategies depends 
largely on the quality of company’s management. An important aspect of management 
quality is experience, which affects a manager’s knowledge of the company. The tenure of 
the CEO is something the financial community will take to consideration regarding future 
prospects. A high level of continuity generally increases the likelihood of positive business 
developments. Frequent fluctuations on the other hand, may require plausible explanations in 
order to avoid market uncertainty (Meckel 2007).  
 
Companies often implement CEO succession programmes whereby the replacement CEO 
will either be someone internal to the organization, thus already having the knowledge about 
the company and industry as well as being familiar with the company’s processes and 
procedures. (Bonnier 1989) explains that the succession program for the departing manager is 
a critical variable in explaining a firms performance. Inside successions are understood to be 
less disruptive than external successions and thus are hypothesized to result in less volatility. 
After a turnover event, there may be increased uncertainty about the future prospects of the 
firm because the skill and strategy of the successor are not known with absolute precision 
(Clayton 2003).  
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Conversely, there may be cases where an outside successor has a well-known track record; 
here the market would have more precise estimates. This may occur whereby the board hires 
an outsider from the same industry. Here, outside successions may not have significantly 
different uncertainty than inside successions. If the new CEO has a good track record, then 
the market may react positively to an outside succession (Clayton 2003). In this instance, the 
market would perceive the future prospects of the company to be better than before the CEO 
change and would thus attach greater value to the company.  
 
The real effect focuses more closely on how the market perceives the CEO of the company to 
be relevant in relation to how the succeeding CEO influences the future of the company. Any 
change to the CEO of a company therefore has the potential to effect market expectations of 
the future of the company, thereby impacting the value market participants place on the 
company. This change in value can be observed from the resulting change in share price 
performance in response to the CEO appointment announcement.  
 
2.3 Non-event specific factors responsible for share price performance 
In order to better understand the effect a change in CEO has on share price performance, it is 
important to control for non- event related factors. The equity volatility observed may be due 
to confounding events. (Meznar 1994) explains this as other significant events that have 
occurred during the period subject to CEO change which could impact share price 
performance. For example, an announcement on a change in CEO following an earnings 
announcement cannot be argued to be the sole reason for any observed volatility.  
 
Firm size is understood to be another important variable in analysing equity volatility as 
(Reinganum 1985) suggests that small firms may have less complex control structures and 
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that the effect of a CEO change may result in greater share price volatility.  Share price 
volatility in reaction to CEO appointment announcements is understood to vary across 
different industries. Each industry type is considered to have its own inherent risk; this is 
known as systematic risk. It is argued that systematic risk and average equity volatility risk 
indicators are highly correlated, since they both reflect the aggregate uncertainty faced by 
investors at a given point in time. This volatility effect is argued to be incorporated into share 
prices (Poterba 1986).  
 
According to the common sense view, changes in firms’ CEOs are expected to improve firm 
performance when that firm is performing poorly. Poorly performing firms typically dismiss 
the underperforming CEO and replace them with someone external to the firm. This is 
introduce new strategies and policies tobecause external successors are more likely to  
enhance the value and image of the firms. Thus, based on common sense theory, it is  
expected that changing CEOs who are responsible for poor past performance with outsiders  
will contribute to better performance in the future. 
 
From the above it can be seen that non-event specific variables may influence share price 
volatility. It is believed that reaction of the market in response to the CEO change can better 
be understood by isolating these firm specific variables. The benefit of this approach is 
understood to be attributable to the increased probability in establishing relationships 
previously not hypothesized, thereby enhancing the value of this study. 
 
2.4 Information efficiency of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE).  
Capital markets react to various types of announcements, and one such significant 
announcement is an earnings announcement. In an efficient market, if the announcement 
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conveys important information, then it is assumed that such information shall be reflected in 
share price movements as soon as the information is released into the market (Hussin 2010) 
(Mlonzi 2011). Earnings for example, is an interesting phenomena, this is because earnings 
carry inside information about the company’s future prospects (Aharony 1980). Researchers 
argue that earnings announcements are one of the most important signalling devices used by 
managers to convey information to the public about the future of the company (Lonie 1996). 
Earnings announcements are thus argued to be one of the critical components of testing 
market efficiency (Mlonzi 2011).  
If the market is efficient, the share price should instantaneously reflect the effect of the 
earnings announcement. In support of the efficiency of the JSE, reference shall be made to a 
study conducted by (Rono 2013) which analyses share price reaction to earnings 
announcements for JSE listed companies. The results of this study showed positive and 
significant returns on the month of announcement. This suggests that earnings contain 
important information to the market. These results are consistent with the efficient market 
hypothesis, which suggests that the JSE is informationally efficient to earnings 
announcements.  
(Watson 2012 ), found that companies making financial restatement announcements 
experience significant negative standardised abnormal returns. As evidenced by the 
significance of the abnormal returns, it appears that these announcements convey new 
information to the market. It should, however, be noted that this study finds the JSE not to be 
efficient in semi-strong form, Thompson and Ward (1995), in performing an extensive review 
of studies examining the efficiency of the JSE, conclude that no conclusive answer as to the 
efficiency of the JSE could be reached. Further research on the efficiency on of the JSE in 
semi-strong form has been recommended.  
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It has been argued by (Fama 1991) and (Jensen 1978) that in reality the strong form 
efficiency is probably not achievable, however, it is an ideal standard for the EMH. In 
practice, it seems that markets are likely to be efficient at weak and semi-strong form of 
efficiency only. Therefore, “a more sensible version of the EMH is that prices reflect 
information to the point where acting on it does not exceed the marginal cost of obtaining the 
information” (Fama 1991). In essence, it seems that share prices are predictable only to a 
certain degree. Consequently, the predictability of stock returns is an assumed stylised fact 
within the event study methodology framework.  
The JSE is ranked in the world’s top 20 largest exchanges (by market capitalization), and is 
the largest securities exchange in Africa. In an attempt to enhance efficiency, the JSE has 
undertaken major technological upgrades over the past few years on a consistent drive to 
improve efficiency of trading, which has resulted in trades being executed up to 400 times 
faster than under the previous system. The JSE is also regarded as the frontline regulator for 
the exchanges, by setting and enforcing listing and membership requirements and trading 
rules. The Financial Services Board (FSB) supervises the JSE in the performance of its 
regulatory duties and South Africa is currently ranked 1
st
 in the world in terms of regulation 
of securities exchanges in the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Survey for 
2013-2014. Notwithstanding the limited research supporting the efficiency of the JSE, there 
appears to be reasonable grounds to argue that robustness of JSE regulation and technological 
infrastructure is representative of adequate market efficiency for the purpose of this study. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology: Event Studies 
The first published study using event methodology was by Dolley (1933) who examined the 
price effects of stock split ups, this methodology was further developed by Ball 
(1968).According to Peterson (1989), event study methodology is the most frequently used 
analytical tool in financial research. Using financial market data, an event study will aim to 
measure the impact of a specific event on the value of the firm.  
In order to investigate the effect the CEO appointment announcement on share price 
performance of JSE listed companies, an event study methodology has been used to establish 
whether the CEO appointment announcement results in an abnormal share price return. To 
enhance the understanding of this effect, the dataset was further analysed according to the 
following categories: reason for change, origin of successor, firm size and whether the 
company undergoing a CEO change is financially distressed or not.  
3.1 Event Study Time Line  
The event study time line can be defined as the time period over which the event study will 
run its course. This time line can be broken down into the estimation window and event 
window. The estimation window can be defined as the time period over which parameters 
have been estimated to determine the expected returns of a share. This equals a period of 126 
business days as recommended by Benninga (2008). 
The second component of the time line is the event window. This is the period in which the 
expected returns of a share are compared to actual returns in order to determine whether any 
abnormal returns are observed as a result of the event under study. The event window used is 
a period of 20 days before the event and 20 days after the event. Therefore, the total event 
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window, including the day of the event equals 41 business days.  This can be observed in 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Event Study Time Line 
3.2 Parameters of the market model  
A parameter, in terms of statistics can be defined as a constant or variable term in a function 
that determines the specific form of the function but not its general nature; this can be 
observed as any measurable characteristic of a population, such as the mean or a standard 
deviation. The parameter provides an estimate for the normal returns which are not 
influenced by the returns around the event. The parameters of the market were first 
determined in order to estimate abnormal returns (Binder 1998). Parameters are estimates 
using a pre-event period sample with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. The 
parameter estimates and the event period stock and market index returns were then used to 
estimate abnormal returns (MacKinlay 1997). Brown and Warner (1985) found in their 
simulation tests that OLS performs as well as other complex regression models. Parameter 
estimation addresses the proper treatment of outliers and leverage points that occur at the 
T0 T1 T1 + 1 0 T2
Start date for 
estimation 
window
End date for 
estimation 
window
Start date for 
event window
Event
date
End date for 
event window
ESTIMATION WINDOW
The Estimation Window begins 126 
days before the Event Window.
It is used to determine the expected 
behaviour of a share with respect to 
market factors.  
EVENT WINDOW
Data from this window is used to determine 
the impact of the event on the share price of 
a company. The event window comprises 41 
days. It starts 20 days before the event, 
includes the event date, and finishes 20 days 
after the event.
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peaks of market volatility. This approach is expected to better deal with biases which may 
occur as a result of extreme values among independent variables (Sorokina 2013). 
 
3.3 Expected Normal Returns  
For the purposes of this study, the abnormal returns on a share in response to an event are 
calculated in order to determine whether the event has impacted the share price of the specific 
entity. Before the abnormal return could be calculated, first the expected normal returns were 
calculated in order to establish whether there were any abnormal fluctuations during the 
period. The market model has been used in determining the normal returns. The market 
model is based on the assumption that there is a constant and linear relationship between 
individual asset returns and the return of the market index (Sorokina 2013). For each asset, 
“i”, the market model assumes that the normal returns on a security can be determined by:  
Rit = αi + βjRmt + εit, where:  
  Ri = the expected return for security “i” on month “t”  
  αi = the index alpha (the intercept of the function), in period “t”  
  βi = index beta (the slope of the function) 
  Rmt = the return on the market, on month “t”.  
  εit, = random error term, or random variable uncorrelated with Rit and Rmt   
The state of the economy and common conditions in the market which affect the market as a 
whole are factored in the determination of the normal returns of the respective security. Any 
conditions that may exist or trends which have occurred which cause the price of a share to 
move against the trend is factored in the random error term using the market model equation 
(Gilbertson 1981).   
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3.4 Abnormal Returns  
The idea of this measure is to isolate the effect of the event from other general market 
movements. The abnormal return of the firm at event date is defined as the difference 
between the realized return and the expected return (normal return). The normal return is 
estimated using the market model. The abnormal return for each company is calculated 
within the event window. In the context of the research question, an abnormal return would 
be observed if the realized return as a result of the change in CEO differs from the expected 
return. The market model parameter estimates is used to measure and analyse the abnormal 
returns of the sample as follows: 
ARit = rit – (αi + βirMt)  
rit (αi + βirMt) Where:  is the actual stock return in event window day t, and is the expected 
stock return. 
3.5 Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR)   
CAR is the measure of the sum of the total abnormal returns observed during the event 
window. The aggregation of abnormal returns is important for the purposes of deriving 
inferences for the event of interest.  
The CAR is used to illustrate to what extent a change in CEO of the entity impacts the 
corporations share price during the event window. After applying these measures to the rest 
of the sample using Excel, an inference can be made on the overall impact of CEO changes of 
the organization on the sample. These observations were made on a daily basis by analysing 
the closing share price of each day during the events window. Therefore, CAR can be 
calculated as follows:  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 =  ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑇1+𝑗
𝑡
𝑗=1     
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3.6 Average Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
In order to enhance the value of this study and to control for firm specific characteristics, 
certain company specific characteristics were controlled for. This required careful 
reconstruction and categorisation of the data set. The objective was to identify conceptual 
categories into which the phenomena observed could be grouped into (Strauss 1990). The 
data set was coded according to the following variables: firm size, [measured by market 
capitalization (5 intervals were used)], turnover type i.e. reason for change, this could be 
either voluntary or involuntary and origin of successor, which included either internal or 
external successor, as well as understanding this effect for firms under financial distress and 
dual listed companies. 
The returns of the companies in each of the sub-categories specified above were averaged to 
find the Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) for each sub-category. The Cumulative Average 
Abnormal Returns (CAAR) for each of the sub-categories were then calculated. The formulas 
used to calculate the AAR and the CAAR were as follows: 
AARt =  
1
n
∑ ARit
n
i=1    
CAARt =  ∑ AART1+j
t
j=1   
Having calculated the CAAR for each sub-category, graphs of each CAAR were prepared 
and analysed to try to assess the impact of the event on each sub-category.  
3.7 Data  
3.7.1. Population and sample  
The population used for this study included all companies listed on the JSE, these companies 
included companies whose shares are dual listed on the JSE and any other reputable stock 
exchanges. In order to be included in the sample, the company of interest would have had to 
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have an announcement pertaining to a CEO appointment in the period 1 March 2011 to 28 
February 2014. The total sample used for this study equalled 105 CEO appointment 
announcements. This was established by identifying all the CEO appointments that took 
place from 1 March 2011 to 28 February 2014.  Table 1 in the Appendix contains a list of the 
CEO appointment announcements used in this study. The number of companies identified 
under each sub-category is shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 Companies in each sub-category 
 
3.7.2 Sources of data  
The collection of the data is of high importance with regard to the research methodology used 
in this study. The data obtained is classified as secondary data, since the data was 
accumulated by persons other than the researcher for purposes other than this study. This 
study utilizes two sources of secondary data, that being information pertaining to the changes 
of CEO’s of JSE listed companies and the market price of these companies.  
Information regarding announcements of changes in JSE listed company CEO’s has been 
obtained from SENS announcements. The closing share prices for each of the companies in 
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the study were obtained directly from the JSE. This has been done by analysing the daily 
closing rates of the corporation during the test period. Microsoft Excel has been used to 
calculate the normal returns, estimating parameters as well as calculating the abnormal and 
cumulative abnormal returns of the share.  
3.8 Validity and Reliability  
Validity consists of both internal and external validity. Internal validity refers to how the 
study has measured what it has intended to measure. For the purposes of this study, internal 
validity refers to how the study has captures the effect a change to a CEO of a company will 
have on a company’s share price. The secondary data used in this study were sourced directly 
from the JSE and from the SENS database; these sources are well reputed for providing 
accurate data. The methodology and statistical models applied in this study are commonly 
used, have produced reliable findings and have evidenced applications in other areas of study 
(Bonnier 1989; Clayton 2003; Nthoesane 2014). Since the methodology used includes 
parameter estimation, which is understood to better deal with biases which may exist as a 
result of extreme market conditions (Bonnier 1989). This approach lends support to the 
internal validity of the study. External validity deals with the issue of generalizability of the 
results of the study. The research focusses on the JSE and uses a well-established research 
methodology. The results of the study can therefore be generalised in a South African 
context.  
Reliability is concerned with consistency of the findings. The findings are understood to be 
reliable if repeated applications would result in similar findings, this will be validated through 
estimation of the t-statistic. The crux of interpretive research is to gain insight into the 
underlying subject matter in a fashion other than scientific. The fact that exact replication of a 
study may be difficult does not diminish the reliability of the findings (Merkl-Davies 2011; 
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Maroun 2012). Finally, in ensuring that the findings were not distorted due to some or other 
event occurring in the event window, confounding events have been controlled for.  
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Chapter 4: Findings and Discussions 
4.1 General Discussion 
The results will be presented in the following sequence. The first part will involve a 
discussion on the findings pertaining to the first research question: the effect CEO 
appointment announcements have on share price returns of JSE listed companies. The second 
part will address the second research question 2: the effect CEO appointment announcements 
have on share price returns of JSE listed companies in relation to firm specific and non-event 
related factors. The final section to this chapter summarises part 1 and 2 and discusses the 
findings on an overall level.  
4.2 The Effect CEO appointment announcements has on share price returns of JSE 
listed companies 
The first point in understanding the effect that announcements of CEO appointments have on 
the share prices of companies involved analysing the Abnormal Returns (AR) for the sample 
at the date the announcement was made on the appointment of the new CEO. The direction of 
the AR provides evidence as to whether or not the market reacted positively or negatively to 
the announcement. The significance of these AR was tested for significance using t-statistics 
at a 95% confidence level.  
Hereafter, the Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR) for the sample as a whole 
were analysed to determine the cumulative effect of the CEO announcements. Given that 
announcement on the CEO appointment may have occurred after the announcement was 
made on the departure of the previous CEO, the observation of CAAR allows inferences on 
market expectations on the future of the company for periods both before and after the event 
to be made.   
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4.2.1 CAAR of CEO appointments  
The CAAR’s presented in this and the following sections are analysed with respect to pre and 
post announcement reactions as well as the reaction on the date of the announcement. The 
total number of announcements on CEO appointments for JSE listed companies amounted to 
105 for the period 1 March 2011 to 28 February 2014. These companies were ranked in 
alphabetical order see Table 1.  
 As seen in Figure 3, the CAAR for the announcement of the appointment of the CEO show 
a degree of uncertainty in the market as depicted by the negative CAR’s observed throughout 
the 20 day event window preceding the announcement on the CEO appointment. Empirical 
evidence supports the hypothesis that investors react unfavourably to announcements over 
appointments of CEOs on the JSE (Nthoesane 2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. CAAR for all the CEO Announcements 
It can be seen that the CAAR are predominantly negative. This is as expected given that the 
announcement on the departing CEO is typically made before the announcement on the 
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appointment of the succeeding CEO. These negative CAAR observed before the 
announcement may be argued to be due to investors having an expectation of a CEO change 
thus conferring upon a degree of uncertainty on the future of the company. This can be seen 
from the volatility observed in the AAR in Figure 4.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. AAR for all the CEO Announcements 
Consistent with Figure 3, Figure 4 illustrates a high degree of volatility during the event 
window. On the day of the event, T0, it can be seen the market generally reacts positively to 
the CEO appointment announcement. This is explained by a 0.91% AAR on the day of the 
event, see Appendix 2. The t-test statistic indicates that this reaction is significant at a 95% 
 confidence level. 
On the day of the event, forty four of these companies experienced significant abnormal 
returns. The two largest negative abnormal returns were for RBA Holdings Limited and 
Ansys Limited who experienced negative abnormal returns of 26.36% and 10.57% 
respectively. The two largest positive abnormal returns were for Nutrional Holdings Ltd and 
Evraz Highveld Steel and Vanadium Ltd who experienced positive abnormal returns of 
33.26% and 17.66% respectively. These abnormal returns evidence instances where market 
participants either reacted negatively or positively in response to a CEO appointment 
announcement.  
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On the date of the event, there were 61 announcements resulting in positive abnormal returns, 
and 44 negative abnormal returns. This indicates that the majority of the sample’s market 
participants reacted positively to the CEO appointment announcement. This is consistent with 
the findings of Nthoesane (2014) who observed a slight increase in the performance of the 
security on the day of the announcement. He further argues that this increase in performance 
is due to the previous expectation regarding the nature of the successor i.e. internal/external 
not being met, for example, possibly a better quality CEO was appointed.  
The CAAR during the post event window continue to decline. At the end of the event 
window, the CAAR is negative 2.55%, indicating that the overall market reaction in response 
to the CEO appointment announcement has been unfavourable. When isolating the CAAR for 
the post-event window, the results indicate that half of the sample has reacted positively to 
the announcement and the other half has reacted negatively to the CEO appointment 
announcement. The two largest negative cumulative abnormal returns included Keaton 
Energy Holdings Ltd and Esorfranki Ltd who generated -40.73% and -38.77% cumulative 
abnormal returns in response to the event. The two largest positive abnormal returns were 
with respect to Control Instruments Group Ltd and Infrasors Holdings Limited who displayed 
37.54% and 37.8% cumulative abnormal returns respectively. 
4.3 The effect CEO appointment announcements on share price returns of JSE listed 
companies in relation to firm specific and non-event related factors 
In this part of this chapter, an analysis is made on the market’s reaction to the event according 
to the reason the CEO departed, the nature of the successor, the firm size, the type of listing 
and whether the company was in financial distress preceding the CEO change. This approach 
facilitates developing an understanding on which factors have an influence on the market’s 
reaction to CEO appointment announcements, thus enhancing the understanding on this effect 
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at an overall level. The tables and graphs representing the cumulative average abnormal 
returns are for a 41 day period. This includes a 20 day pre-event window, the day of the event 
and a 20 day post-event window. This will allow a determination to be made on the markets 
perception of the company’s future prospects prior to the announcement and after the 
announcement. 
4.3.1 Reason for CEO change: Voluntary or Involuntary 
Furtado and Karan (1990) argue that the type of turnover, whether forced or voluntary has a 
significant impact on the performance of firms. Researchers such as Clayton’s (2003) have 
indicated that forced changes (involuntary) in CEOs results in significantly higher volatility 
than voluntary departures, as forced departures typically indicate poor performance and thus 
may result in strategic changes once a new CEO is appointed. This is understood to create 
uncertainty on the future of the company and therefore result in higher share price volatility. 
The opposite effect has also been well documented. As studies have provided evidence that 
voluntary turnover shows a small performance improvement, whereas forced turnover  
contributes to positive market eactions regarding the announcement of the management  r
turnover (Friedman & Singh, 1989; Denis & Denis, 1995; Rhim et al., 2006).  
4.3.1.1 CAAR for voluntary and involuntary departures  
Figure 5 illustrates that during the pre-event window, the market has reacted negatively to 
both involuntary and voluntary turnovers, this can be seen negative CAAR of -4.32% for 
involuntary (Forced) turnovers and negative -0.45% CAAR for voluntary turnovers. For both 
involuntary and voluntary departures the CAAR are both negative, this can be understood to 
be due to increased market uncertainty. This is explained by (Nthoesane 2014) who states 
that these negative CARs are due to the investors having an expectation of a CEO change. 
The strength of the CAAR indicates that market participants react more strongly to 
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involuntary departures than voluntary departures. This is view can be further reinforced when 
observing the higher level of volatility for involuntary departures in comparison to voluntary 
departures. These findings are consistent with those of (Clayton 2003) and (Bonnier 1989) 
who explain that that forced departures implies a higher probability of large strategy changes.  
After the day of the announcement, Figure 5 displays how the market reacts unfavourably to 
involuntary turnovers during the period succeeding the CEO appointment announcement; 
voluntary turnovers on the other hand remain constant during the majority of the post-event 
window, but decline after T16.  In summary, at the end of the event window, voluntary 
turnovers show CAAR of negative -1.41% and involuntary turnovers have CAAR of negative 
-5.42%. This direction of the CAAR was expected, given that the overall effect is negative. 
However, the strength of the CAAR at the end of the event window, indicate that market 
participants react more strongly to involuntary turnovers than voluntary. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. CAAR for Voluntary and Involuntary Turnovers 
On the day of the event, the AAR for involuntary and voluntary changes are both positive, 
being 1.98% and 0.47% respectively. This indicates that market participants generally react 
positively to CEO change announcements for both voluntary and involuntary departures. 
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AAR for both involuntary and voluntary turnovers are found to be significant at a 95% 
confidence level. The AAR for involuntary departures are found to be stronger than voluntary 
departures, thus indicating that the market reacts more favourably on the day the replacement 
CEO is announced for involuntary departures than voluntary, see Figure 6.  
For voluntary turnovers, the most significant AR were for Nutrional Holdings Ltd and RBA 
Holdings Limited who generated positive AR of 33.26% and negative AR of 26.36% 
respectively. For involuntary turnovers, the strongest negative AR was only 3.91% for 
Securedata Holdings Ltd; however, the highest positive AR was 36.29% for African Eagles 
Res Plc. These findings can be explained by (Nthoesane 2014) who states that involuntary 
departures reveal higher positive abnormal returns than voluntary departures due to investor 
expectations not being met, that is, a better quality CEO was appointed than expected.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. AAR for Voluntary and Involuntary Turnovers 
Consistent with Ciccone (2006), who argues that forced turnovers are more likely to result in  
large strategic changes. These findings can be argued to be an illustration of the information 
effect in that during the pre-event window i.e. the announcement on the departing CEO could 
potentially be interpreted as a signal on the overall well-being of the company. Furthermore, 
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the strong CAAR observed in the post-event window can also be viewed as an illustration of 
the real effect, as these forced turnovers are indicative of large strategic changes. Market 
participants may view this announcement relative to the implications it has on the future 
prospects of the company.  
4.3.2 Origin of successor 
The origin of the departing CEOs successor is believed to be a key factor responsible for the 
direction and significance of the abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns observed during 
Dherment-Ferere and the event window in response to a CEO appointment announcement. 
Reneboog (2002) states that the benefit of internal successions is in conjunction with the 
internal successor enhanced understanding about the firm’s condition, product, market, 
competition etc. To the contrary, it is further argued that external successors are better adept 
at maintaining corporate image, especially when the company is under financial distress. 
Another advantage of external successor is seen to be due to the new vision and passion they 
bring into the company. According to (Bonnier 1989), external successor are hypothesized to 
have a negative effect on performance. He explains that inside successions are less disruptive 
than external successions and thus result in less volatility. 
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4.3.2.1 CAAR for internal and external successions 
From the 105 CEO appointments, 67 were internal changes and 38 were external 
appointments. 
 
Figure 7. CAAR for Internal and External successor 
CAAR during the pre-event window remain relatively stable for both internal and external 
appointments as depicted in Figure 7.  Internal successions show negative CAAR on the day 
before the announcement on the CEO changes i.e. T-1 of -2.94% and external CEO 
succession show positive 0.89%. Both successor types show relatively minimal volatility 
during the pre-event window.  Internal appointments show a steady decline whereas external 
appointment’s CAAR fluctuate around 0.The negative CAAR can be explained by possible 
leakages of the company’s intention to appoint a person internal to the company. This is 
relevant given that the market may already have expectations on the quality of the persons 
likely to succeed the CEO. 
From Figure 8, the most noticeable fluctuations for external appointments occur two days 
prior to the announcement on the CEO change, whereby share price performance increases by 
1.86%. This can be explained by either information spillage on the replacement CEO or 
anticipation of market participants. On the day the announcement is made, external 
appointments reveal positive AAR of 2.55% and internal appointments show negative AAR 
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of 2.94% both these ARs are considered significant at a 95% confidence level. This is 
consistent with the findings of (Nthoesane 2014) who explains that external appointments 
result in positive AAR due to investor expectations on the replacement CEO not being met, 
and thus a positive reaction is observed possibly due to a better quality CEO being appointed 
than expected. Worrel, Davidson and Glascock (1993) produce similar findings evidencing 
that outside CEOs increase shareholder wealth. 
 
 
 
 
 
Through the course of the post-event window, internal appointments display decreasing 
CAAR whereas external appointment maintains positive CAAR which fluctuate between 
positive 2-4%. These contrasting CAAR indicate clearly that the market reacts positively to 
Charitou, Patis, and Vlittis external appointments and negatively to internal appointments. 
(2010) also found positive market reactions to the announcement of outside incoming CEOs 
in the US. This result shows the market perceives that outside incoming CEOs bring positive 
influences to the firms’ performances.  
4.3.3 Financially Distressed firms 
The previous sections of this chapter have discussed the information effect explained by 
(Furtado 1990) of the CEO appointment announcement. In order to eliminate the information 
effect, and focus more closely on the real effect, the analysis share price performance in 
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response to CEO appointment announcements has been undertaken using the share returns of 
financially distressed companies. This approach, according to Bonnier (1989) is believed to 
eliminate any information effect as the CEO appointment announcement is unlikely to signal 
significant information about the state of the firm.   
4.3.3.1 CAAR for Financially Distressed firms 
The number of companies deemed to be under financial distress amounted to 10. The 
remaining 95 companies were thus not considered to be in financial distress. In ascertaining 
whether or not a company is in financial distress or not has been determined was using 
certain key indicators. For example, 1 Time Holdings Ltd, Adcock Ingram’s Holdings Ltd, 
African Bank Investments Ltd, African Dawn Capital Ltd all had announcements on poor 
performance. For the remaining company’s, announcements on decreases in headline 
earnings, disposal of core operations, disposal of major subsidiaries, refinancing of debt, 
difficulty in securing finance and difficult market conditions  provided indication on whether 
the company was under financial distress. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The significance of these findings is derived from the separation of the information effect and 
real effect of the CEO appointment announcement on share price returns. From Figure 9, the 
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blue line shows the CAAR for firms which are not under financial distress, here the 
announcement contains both an information effect and real effect. The red line shows the 
CAAR for firms under financial distress, here the announcement contains only the real effect, 
since the state of the company is already known i.e. under financial distress; any information 
effect of the announcement is considered unlikely.  
It is immediately apparent that the CAAR for firms under financial distress are a lot more 
volatile than the CAAR which are not under financial distress. The financially distressed 
companies show strong negative CAAR as can be seen at T-1, which are negative -11.36% on 
the day before the announcement. Conversely, the CAAR for firms which aren’t financially 
distressed are positive 0.87% on the day before the announcement.  
On the day of the announcement, Figure 10 illustrates how both groups experience positive 
significant AAR, as companies under financial distress show positive AAR of 2.29% and 
companies not under financial distress generate positive AAR of 0.24%. These findings 
further support the view that firms under financial distress experience significantly greater 
volatility compared to firms who are not. These findings are consistent with those of (Bonnier 
1989), found a stronger positive return of 2.5% for firms under financial distress. A possible 
reason for this is that market participants may react favourably to a new vision and strategic 
changes. 
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Figure 10. AAR for financially distressed firms 
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For the period succeeding the announcement i.e. post-event window, Figure 9 and Figure 10 
both illustrate the same effect observed during the pre-event window, that is negative CAAR 
and AAR for firms under financial distress and relatively stable positive CAAR for firms 
which aren’t under financial distress. At the end of the event period, the total CAAR for each 
group is as follows: financial distress firms generate a total of 13.97% negative CAAR and 
the latter displaying negative -1.39% CAAR.  
4.3.4 Firm Size 
Firm size is understood to be another important variable in analysing equity volatility as 
(Reinganum 1985) suggests that small firms may have less complex control structures and 
that the effect of a CEO change may result in greater share price volatility.  
4.3.4.1 CAAR in relation to firm size 
In analysing how CEO appointment announcements effect share price returns of companies 
in relation to their firm size, the sample has been categorized into five different groups in 
accordance with size of their share price. See Figure 11 
 
Figure 11. AAR for firm sizes 
The usefulness of segmenting the data set into its firm size is that this more clearly illustrates 
the trend on the share price reaction in response to CEO appointment announcements more 
clearly than when observed on an overall level. This trend can be observed in Figure 12.  
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On average, the CAAR for each firm size can be observed in accordance with Table 2. 
20 day window 
     Size (-20:-9) (-8:-1) 0 (1:8) (9:20) 
Code 1 -1.80% -2.93% 0.08% -0.53% -1.91% 
Code 2 1.32% -0.91% -1.18% 0.87% 0.40% 
Code 3 0.16% 0.07% -1.83% -0.51% -1.60% 
Code 4 2.92% -0.03% -3.44% -1.05% 0.18% 
Code 5 -0.61% -1.21% -0.99% -2.09% -1.84% 
Table 2 
From period T-20 to T-9, CAAR remain relatively stable and fluctuate between -2% and 2%, 
this is with exception to Code 4. For the period T-8 to T-1, the CAAR for all firm sizes 
decrease. This is understood to be due to the announcement on the departure of the previous 
CEO, or as a result of market participants developing expectations on the replacement CEO. 
The levels of volatility however, remain consistent, in that firms with higher share prices 
experience higher volatility than firms with lower share prices. For the period T1 to T8, the 
AAR increases, as seen by the re duction in negative CAAR. These increases occur up to 
T9 whereby CAAR for all firm sizes begin to decrease up to T20.   
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One of the key findings pertaining hereto can be observed from how high value firms 
experience higher volatility than smaller firms.  This trend observed is inconsistent with 
(Reinganum 1985) suggestion that smaller firms experience greater volatility. A possible 
explanation for this inconsistency can be conferred upon the JSE regulations and Companies 
Act requirements which require a certain standards on internal controls, management 
structures and financial reporting to be adhered to. Secondly, the reasoning behind the above 
mentioned trend can be interpreted in light of Cools and van Praag (2007) trading volume 
approach which may suggest that firms with higher share prices experience greater volumes 
in transactions around the CEO announcements.  This seems rational given that for firms with 
higher share prices, each percentage change results in greater changes in shareholder wealth 
in comparison to firms with smaller share prices.  
Lastly, the trend observed from these findings can be understood in relation to how the value 
of a CEO is perceived in relation to the future prospects of the company. The rationale behind 
this is in consideration to the possibility that the departing CEO may have been responsible 
for the growth of the company’s share price.  This creates uncertainty as the replacement 
CEO may not be able to create similar shareholder returns. Smaller firms however, may 
experience less volatile returns given that these smaller companies were probably listed for a 
shorter period in comparison to firms with greater share prices.  
4.3.5. Listing type 
The effect CEO appointment announcements on share price performance has strong 
association with the efficiency in which new information is incorporated into prices (Clayton 
2003). It is said that if the announcement on CEO appointment conveys important 
information, then it is assumed that this information shall be reflected in share price 
movements as soon as the information is released into the market (Hussin 2010). There is not 
P a g e  | 46 
 
a strong body of knowledge supporting strong form efficiency in the JSE. Current research 
supports only a semi-strong or weak form efficient market. This suggests that share prices do 
not at all times reflect new information immediately.  
The purpose of analysing the effect CEO appointment announcements in relation to listing 
type will enable the understanding of this effect to be made using information from the JSE 
as well data of shares who listed both on the JSE as well as another reputable stock exchange 
 (particularly London and New York Stock Exchange). 
4.3.5.1 CAAR of JSE listed and Dual listed companies 
The total number of CEO appointment announcements for dual listed companies were equal 
to 10. The remaining 95 were with respect to shares listed only the JSE. From Figure 11, it 
can be seen that during the pre-event window, both listing types display negative CAAR; this 
is consistent with the findings displayed in the previous sections. JSE listed shares are 
however less volatile than dual listed shares as CAAR at T1 (day before the event) equal 
negative -1.59% and negative -1.23% for JSE listed and Dual listed share respectively. 
Similarly, on the day of the event, both listing types display positive AAR equal to 0.72% 
and 2.7% for JSE listed and Dual listed companies respectively. During the post-event 
window, the CAAR for each listing type diverge. Dual listed shares indicate that market 
participants react positively to CEO appointment announcements, whereby JSE listed 
companies react negatively.  
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The CAAR displayed at the end of the event window equal -3.55% and +6.99% for JSE and 
Dual listed companies respectively. This market reaction can possibly be due to better quality 
CEOs being appointed for dual listed companies as these companies would more likely have 
strong CEO succession programmes and may also be capable of attracting better quality 
CEOs than its JSE counterpart. Secondly, the CEO change for dual listed companies may be 
as a result of the company obtaining dual listed status as seen by ABSA Bank following their 
acquisition by Barclays Plc, in November 2008 which resulted in the appointment of Maria 
Ramos. This holds strong information effect on the state of the company in their undertakings 
in expanding into the international market. The real effect pertaining hereto can be deduced 
from the show of faith on behalf of foreign shareholders in their perception on the quality of 
the replacement CEO. This effect may further be understood to be due to differences in 
market efficiency of the respective exchanges, this may suggest that information relating to 
the quality of the replacement CEO is incorporated into share prices more timeously and 
more accurately than JSE listed shares. 
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P a g e  | 48 
 
Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations 
This study is believed to fill the gap in current empirical research by investigating the effect 
CEO appointment announcements has on share prices of JSE listed companies. This 
investigation investigates how certain event specific, non-event specific and firm specific 
characteristics influence the reaction of market participants in response to a CEO 
appointment announcement. Finally, this study highlights further research which can be 
conducted in investigating the above mentioned effect. 
5.1 Conclusion on overall effect 
The results of the findings indicate that there is significant negative cumulative average 
abnormal return for the period preceding the announcement, thus evidencing significant 
volatility in the period surrounding the announcement of the CEO change; this is consistent 
with the findings of (Nthoesane 2014). These negative cumulative average abnormal returns 
observed before the announcement may be argued to be due to investors having an 
expectation of a CEO change, however, due to uncertainty involving the reason for the 
change, the type of successor and the future implications for the company, the market reacts 
negatively in response.  
On average, on the date of the event, significant AAR was found. This indicates that on 
average, market participants react positively to a CEO appointment announcement. This is 
supported by the findings reported by (Lassoued 2013) in Tunisia, (Kang 2009) in Asia, 
(Charitou 2010 ), (Van Doom 2011 ), (Vafeas 2009 ) in Europe and (Lubatkin 1989) in 
America who all concluded that there is a positive market reaction in response to 
announcements over a CEO announcement.  
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Focusing more closely on the African market, the findings of (Nthoesane 2014) and 
(Lassoued 2013) were both done on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) and Tunisia, 
although not in the scope of this study, this may suggest an emerging trend on how investors 
in African Markets react to announcements over changes in CEOs. Table 3 shows 
performance returns over the 41 day event window. The majority of the AAR is statistically 
significant at a 95% confidence level. The AAR was generally found to be positive and 
statistically significant on the day of the event. This implies that the market responds 
favourably to announcements of CEO changes. The significance of the AAR provides confers 
to possible linkages between market participants expectations on the future of the company 
and the CEO.  
For the period succeeding the event, it can be seen that the performance returns decrease. A 
number of arguments can be made to support this observation; this may be due to share 
performances returning to normal before the announcement was made, as any strategic 
changes the succeeding CEO intends on bringing into the company may only be observed on 
a date outside the event window. This calls for further research into this phenomena, whereby 
this effect is analysed using longer event window periods. 
5.2 Conclusion per category 
5.2.1 Conclusion on reason for turnover 
The pre-event window revealed high negative CAAR for involuntary turnover. On the day of 
the event however, both involuntary and voluntary turnovers both showed positive AR. 
Involuntary turnovers had higher positive AR than voluntary. Forced turnovers increase 
volatility more than voluntary turnovers; hereby evidencing an investor expectation on large 
strategy changes. The CAAR for voluntary turnovers were mostly positive throughout the 
event window whereas the opposite effect was observed for involuntary turnovers. From 
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these findings, it can be deduced that market participants react favourably to CEO-initiated 
turnover as voluntary changes as opposed to forced changes are less likely to be interpreted 
as a signal to the market on poor performance of the company.   
5.2.2 Conclusion on Origin of successor 
Several studies lend support to the importance the origin of the successor has on 
understanding the market reaction to the change in CEO. These studies however, provides 
strong evidence supporting the view that external appointments could either result in positive 
or negative market reactions, (Bonnier 1989) proposes two hypotheses pertaining hereto. 
Firstly, the market may either react positively due to the board of directors knowing insiders 
better than outsiders and thus are less likely to make bad appointments, alternatively, external 
successors represent change and are less likely to be committed to past policies thus enabling 
alterations to company strategy and mission objectives. For the majority of the pre-event 
window, both internal and external successions reveal negative cumulative abnormal returns 
The findings of this study provide strong support to the view that the origin of the 
replacement CEO does influence the market’s reaction in response to a CEO appointment 
announcement. The findings for this section display that CAAR for internal appointments are 
on average negative throughout the event window. On the other hand, external appointments 
show relatively stable CAAR during the pre-event window but show a strong positive AR on 
the day of the event and continue to increase throughout the post-event window. This 
provides evidence that market participants of the JSE react more favourably to external 
appointments than internal appointments. Furthermore, it can be seen that the market reacts 
more favourably to strategic changes and a new vision being brought into the company. This 
interpretation is corroborated when considering that the internal successor may follow a 
similar approach to the departing CEO.   
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5.2.3 Conclusion on non-event specific factors 
There is a strong body of research on the effect CEO changes have on share performance. 
These findings however have been argued to be inconclusive due to the inconsistency in 
(Weisbach 1995), (Denis 1995) and (Huson findings. Positive reactions were observed by 
2003). In Japan Kang and Shivdasani (1996) found positive abnormal returns.  
Conversely, (Reinganum 1985) did not find any market reactions in the US. Negative 
reactions were found by (Lassoued 2013) in Tunisia, (Kang 2009) in Asia, (Charitou 2010 ), 
(Van Doom 2011 ), (Vafeas 2009 ) in Europe and (Lubatkin 1989  ) in America.
In summary, there appears to be a strong body of knowledge supporting the view that a 
change in CEO of an organization may result in a change in the value market participants 
attach to the company. 
The inconsistency in findings is argued to arise from the a confounding information effect 
associated with the announcement on CEO change and the CEO change (Bonnier 1989). In 
this part of the study, an analysis is performed on the share price reaction in response to a 
CEO change, focusing only on companies in financial distress. This approach allows removal 
of the negative information effect associated with the announcement, thereby enabling an 
analysis on the real effect to be undertaken. The findings of this section revealed that firms 
under financial distress experience a higher level of volatility in comparison to its 
counterpart. Furthermore, the CAAR of firms in financial distress were mostly negative, 
whereas the opposite effect was observed for companies which weren’t under financial 
distress whereby high positive CAAR were displayed.  Notwithstanding that a relatively 
small sample was used, the significance of these findings warrant further research on this 
relationship to be undertaken.  
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Appendix 
 
The following appendices are included in this report.  
  Table 1: CEO appointment announcements 
  Table 2: Announcements which were significant at a 95% confidence level 
  Table 3: Event Window Returns 
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Table 1: CEO appointment announcements 
Company Date of CEO appointment announcement 
1time Holdings Ltd 5-Sep-11 
Adcock Ingram Holdings Ltd 3-Apr-14 
Advtech Limited 2014/08/11 
AECI Ltd 2012/11/28 
African Bank Investments Ltd 2014/10/06 
African Dawn Capital Ltd 2012/05/24 
African Dawn Capital Ltd 2011/12/22 
African Oxygen Ltd 2011/12/09 
AFROCENTRIC INVESTMENT CORP 2012/09/10 
AH Vest Ltd 2012/10/29 
Anglo American Platinum Ltd 2012/07/19 
Anglogold Ashanti Ltd 2013/02/21 
Ansys Limited 2013/06/05 
ARB Holdings Ltd 2014/09/18 
ArcelorMittal South Africa Ltd 2014/05/22 
Ascension Properties Ltd 2014/08/29 
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Astrapak Limited 2012/05/30 
Astrapak Limited 2012/10/19 
Aveng Ltd 2014/02/11 
Basil Read Holdings Ltd 2014/08/27 
Basil Read Holdings Ltd 2014/03/27 
Bauba Platinum Ltd 2013/02/08 
Beige Holdings Ltd 2013/01/16 
Bsi (sa) Limited 2014/04/21 
Business Connexion Group Ltd 2014/06/12 
Cadiz Holdings Ltd 2012/02/21 
Calgro M3 Holdings Limited 2009/12/14 
Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd 2013/09/23 
CHEMICAL SPECIALITIES LIMITED 2013/01/01 
Cipla Medpro South Africa Ltd 2013/06/20 
Control Instruments Group Ltd 2011/12/14 
Coronation Fund Managers Ltd 2013/02/01 
Cullinan Holdings Ltd 2013/06/14 
Dorbyl Ltd 2013/01/16 
P a g e  | 60 
 
Efficient Invest  2013/08/13 
ELB Group Ltd 2013/01/01 
Esorfranki Ltd 2014/09/01 
Evraz Highveld Steel And Vanadium Ltd 2014/10/01 
Evraz Highveld Steel And Vanadium Ltd 2014/04/16 
Famous Brands Ltd 2014/02/28 
Fountainhead Property Trust 2014/10/28 
Gijima Group Ltd 2013/10/13 
Gijima Group Ltd 2012/09/26 
Gooderson Leisure Corporation Limited 2012/03/30 
Grand Parade Investments Ltd 2013/02/13 
Hospitality Property Fund Ltd 2013/02/20 
Hudaco Industries Ltd 2014/06/30 
Illovo Sugar Ltd 2011/09/15 
Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd 2012/01/31 
Imperial Holdings Ltd 2014/02/20 
Infrasors Holdings Limited 2013/05/31 
Invicta Holdings Ltd 2014/09/02 
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Italtile Ltd 2014/07/01 
JD Group Ltd 2013/08/09 
Kagiso Media Ltd 2013/08/02 
Kap Industrial Holdings Ltd 2014/11/14 
Keaton Energy Holdings Ltd 2012/08/07 
Keaton Energy Holdings Ltd 2012/06/06 
Kumba Iron Ore Ltd 2012/07/19 
Liberty Holdings Ltd 2014/03/01 
Life Healthcare Group Holdings Ltd 2014/03/31 
Massmart Holdings Ltd 2014/04/11 
Merafe Resources Ltd 2012/05/29 
MINE RESTORATION INVESTMENTS Ltd 2013/11/18 
MoneyWeb Holdings Ltd 2014/08/07 
Nampak Limited 2013/10/14 
Naspers Limited 2014/02/24 
Northam Platinium 2014/06/30 
Palabora Mining Co. Ltd. 2013/11/01 
Peregrine Holdings Ltd. 01/04/2013 
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Pick 'n Pay Holdings Ltd. 2013/01/22 
RMB Holdings Ltd. 2014/08/10 
Rare Holdings Ltd. 2012/04/13 
Redefine Properties Ltd 2014/06/26 
Remgro Limited 2014/04/30 
Reunert LTD 2014/08/08 
SA Corporate Real Estate Fund 2014/06/01 
SacOil Holdings Ltd. 2014/06/01 
Sanyati Holdings Limited 2012/06/30 
Securedata Hldg Ltd 2012/08/01 
Sherbourne Capital Ltd 2014/07/25 
Sovereign Food Investments Ltd 2012/05/18 
Spar Group Ltd 2013/11/12 
Spur Corp Ltd 2012/03/02 
Standard Bank Group Ltd 2013/07/03 
Sun International Ltd. 23-Nov-12 
Village Main Reef Ltd 12-Aug-13 
Wescoal Holdings Ltd. 10-Sep-12 
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Zeder Investments Ltd 23-Jul-12 
Zurich Insurance Co. S.A. Ltd. 01-Mar-12 
Alert Steel Holdings Ltd 2013/02/28 
Nutritional Holdings Ltd 2012/11/30 
Pioneer Food Group Ltd. 2013/02/22 
Protech Khuthele Holdings Ltd. 2011/09/01 
RBA Holdings Limited 2012/09/10 
SABMiller plc 2013/04/23 
BHP Billiton plc 2013/20/02 
Anglo American plc 2013/01/08 
Lonmin plc 2013/04/02 
Lonmin plc 2012/12/28 
Pan African Resource plc 2013/09/09 
Pan African Resource plc 2013/02/27 
African Eagle Res plc 2011/09/15 
African Eagle Res plc 2014/11/14 
IPSA Group plc 2011/09/08 
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Table 2: Announcements which were significant at a 95% confidence level 
Company Abnormal Returns AR significant 
Advtech Limited 3.08% Yes 
African Bank Investments Ltd 2.36% Yes 
African Oxygen Ltd -4.37% Yes 
Anglo American Platinum Ltd -2.14% Yes 
Ansys Limited -10.57% Yes 
Ascension Properties Ltd 1.94% Yes 
Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd 3.24% Yes 
Control Instruments Group Ltd 6.51% Yes 
Coronation Fund Managers Ltd -1.67% Yes 
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Esorfranki Ltd 6.58% Yes 
Evraz Highveld Steel And Vanadium Ltd 17.66% Yes 
Evraz Highveld Steel And Vanadium Ltd 2.98% Yes 
Gooderson Leisure Corporation Limited 13.22% Yes 
Hospitality Property Fund Ltd 5.92% Yes 
Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd -4.48% Yes 
Imperial Holdings Ltd -3.76% Yes 
Infrasors Holdings Limited -3.55% Yes 
Keaton Energy Holdings Ltd 3.40% Yes 
Keaton Energy Holdings Ltd 2.18% Yes 
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Kumba Iron Ore Ltd 5.72% Yes 
Life Healthcare Group Holdings Ltd 1.60% Yes 
Merafe Resources Ltd 3.70% Yes 
MINE RESTORATION INVESTMENTS Ltd -8.98% Yes 
MoneyWeb Holdings Ltd 6.57% Yes 
Nampak Limited 3.43% Yes 
Naspers Limited 3.57% Yes 
Redefine Properties Ltd 2.45% Yes 
Reunert LTD -1.92% Yes 
Securedata Hldg Ltd -3.91% Yes 
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Spar Group Ltd -3.25% Yes 
Spur Corp Ltd 4.12% Yes 
Sun International Ltd. -1.63% Yes 
Village Main Reef Ltd 9.32% Yes 
Alert Steel Holdings Ltd -1.82% Yes 
Nutritional Holdings Ltd 33.26% Yes 
Pioneer Food Group Ltd. 3.59% Yes 
Protech Khuthele Holdings Ltd. 1.91% Yes 
RBA Holdings Limited -26.36% Yes 
SABMiller plc 3.03% Yes 
P a g e  | 68 
 
BHP Billiton plc -2.75% Yes 
Lonmin plc -2.92% Yes 
Pan African Resource plc -2.36% Yes 
Pan African Resource plc -4.39% Yes 
African Eagle Res plc 36.29% Yes 
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Table 3: Event Window Returns 
  
Unadjusted Cross Sectional Errors  
  
       
  
Unadjusted Cross Sectional Errors 
  
  
0.085555% 
  
       
 
 
Sample 
Day 
relative 
to event 
 
AAR 
T-stat (2 
tailed) 95% 
Significant 
(95%) 
Significant 
(99%) 
SD 
-20 
 
-0.70% -8.14 YES YES 0.45% 
-19 
 
0.00% 0.02 NO NO 0.05% 
-18 
 
-0.29% -3.34 YES YES 0.16% 
-17 
 
0.64% 7.45 YES YES 0.49% 
-16 
 
-0.22% -2.52 YES NO 0.11% 
-15 
 
-0.88% -10.23 YES YES 0.57% 
-14 
 
0.44% 5.15 YES YES 0.36% 
-13 
 
-0.07% -0.83 NO NO 0.01% 
-12 
 
0.76% 8.84 YES YES 0.58% 
-11 
 
-0.55% -6.48 YES YES 0.35% 
-10 
 
0.25% 2.93 YES YES 0.22% 
-9 
 
0.32% 3.69 YES YES 0.27% 
-8 
 
-0.66% -7.69 YES YES 0.42% 
-7 
 
-0.47% -5.52 YES YES 0.29% 
-6 
 
-0.29% -3.44 YES YES 0.16% 
-5 
 
-0.12% -1.39 NO NO 0.04% 
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-4 
 
-0.04% -0.43 NO NO 0.02% 
-3 
 
-0.03% -0.36 NO NO 0.02% 
-2 
 
-0.21% -2.50 YES NO 0.11% 
-1 
 
0.57% 6.63 YES YES 0.45% 
0 
 
0.91% 10.58 YES YES 0.68% 
1 
 
0.09% 1.02 NO NO 0.11% 
2 
 
0.23% 2.66 YES YES 0.20% 
3 
 
0.18% 2.13 YES NO 0.17% 
4 
 
-0.39% -4.60 YES YES 0.23% 
5 
 
-0.28% -3.26 YES YES 0.15% 
6 
 
0.51% 5.90 YES YES 0.40% 
7 
 
-0.98% -11.51 YES YES 0.65% 
8 
 
0.78% 9.13 YES YES 0.60% 
9 
 
-0.09% -1.10 NO NO 0.02% 
10 
 
-0.12% -1.41 NO NO 0.04% 
11 
 
-0.01% -0.07 NO NO 0.04% 
12 
 
-0.05% -0.63 NO NO 0.01% 
13 
 
-0.29% -3.38 YES YES 0.16% 
14 
 
0.09% 1.02 NO NO 0.11% 
15 
 
-0.33% -3.83 YES YES 0.19% 
16 
 
-0.20% -2.34 YES NO 0.10% 
17 
 
-0.93% -10.82 YES YES 0.61% 
18 
 
0.12% 1.45 NO NO 0.13% 
19 
 
-0.52% -6.07 YES YES 0.32% 
20 
 
0.30% 3.47 YES YES 0.25% 
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Average 
 
-0.06% -0.73 NO NO 0.00% 
 
 
